Stories of tax- dodging corporate giants make headlines on a weekly basis. None-theless, governments manage to collect over US$2 trillion in corporate income tax each year, much of it from big multinational businesses.1 This book is about the rules governments have negotiated to divide the tax base among themselves: how they are designed to work, rather than how they are circumvented by un-scrupulous companies and individuals.2 As a long tradition of legal scholarship argues, those rules, written by a club of higher- income countries, deny lower-income countries a fair share.3 Tax is hardly unique in this regard, and the past two de cades have seen backlashes against institutions of global economic gover-nance that exhibit such a bias, including the IMF, the World Trade Organ ization (WTO), and the network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).4 There are now some signs of or ga nized discontent in the international tax regime, but its long- standing resilience, while other lopsided regimes have faltered, makes it an in ter-est ing case in the broader story of global economic governance.