All areas of philosophy are characterized by dissent. Philosophers disagree among themselves in innumerable ways, and this pervasive and permanent dissensus is a sign of their inability to solve philosophical problems and present well-established philosophical truths. Every philosopher who has not buried his head in the sand knows or at least suspects this.The saddest aspect of this failure is that philosophers have been unable to solve philosophical problems which deeply affect all of us existentially—problems whose stakes were the highest out of all theoretical problems. What I have in mind are questions like “Is there a God?”; “What is the relationship between mind and body?”; “Do we have free will and moral responsibility?” Philosophers have also been unable to solve those big philosophical problems whose existential weight cannot be compared to the above three, but whose theoretical significance is unquestionable. These include, for example, questions such as “What is the distinguishing mark of mental phenomena?”; “Do we have direct access to a mind-independent reality in veridical perception?”; “Do physical objects have spatiotemporal parts?” And philosophers have not managed to solve those philosophical problems that have no particular existential weight or even theoretical significance, either. Some examples are questions (concocted in philosophical laboratories, so to speak) such as “What kind of entities are holes?”; “Are disjunctive properties genuine properties?”; “Can one unintentionally produce abstract artifacts?”.