Right after the 2010 earthquake that rocked the Port-au-Prince region and killed many people, a big data competition began between states and in-ternational organizations involved in the relief eff ort. The journalists Rob-ert Muggah and Athena Kolbe, a year and half after the disaster, wrote that “in Haiti, fewer than 46,000 people were killed in the January 2010earthquake. Or perhaps the death toll was more than 300,000” (2011). The Haitian state issued a high toll number of 230,000 deaths days after the quake. Aid agencies and states “allied” to Haiti criticized the fl awed meth-odology of Haitian experts and waited a few months before announcing their own mortality count. The United States Agency of International De-velopment, in May 2011, stated that between 46,000 and 85,000 people died in the disaster. This much smaller number had consequences: it min-imized the need for assistance at a time when the ?10 billion pledged by international donors had not been disbursed. Obliquely, it pushed nongov-ernmental organizations (NGOs) to reassess and sometimes shorten their missions in Haiti. In brief, the numbers battle was an academic exercise between diff erent experts that directly and indirectly fueled ideological and logistical debates linked to the amount of aid needed. In a cynical fashion, we could now say, more than ten years after the earthquake, that these debates did not really matter. Despite the disbursement of billions of dollars, most of the reconstruction of infrastructures and buildings has not yet happened, and Haiti is today battered by overlapping political, economic, and environmental crises.