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E-book Thick Evaluation
magine I tell you that Maddy is bad. Perhaps you infer from my intonation, or thecontext in which we are talking, that I mean morally bad. Additionally, you willprobably infer that I am disapproving of Maddy, or saying that I think you shoulddisapprove of her, or similar, given typical linguistic conventions and assuming I amsincere. However, you might not get a more detailed sense of the particular sorts ofway in which Maddy is bad, her typical character traits, and the like, since people canbe bad in many ways. In contrast, if I say that Maddy is wicked, then you get more ofa sense of her typical actions and attitudes to others. The word‘wicked’is morespecific than‘bad’. I have still not exactly pinpointed Maddy’s character sincewickedness takes many forms. But there is more detail nevertheless, perhaps astronger connotation of the sort of person Maddy is. In addition, and again assumingtypical linguistic conventions, you should also get a sense that I am disapproving ofMaddy, or saying that you should disapprove of her, or similar, assuming that we arestill discussing her moral character.This imaginary and somewhat stilted scenario introduces the topic of this study.Concepts such asBADandGOODare normally referred to as thin evaluative concepts(hereafter justthin concepts), whereasWICKED,SELFISH,KIND,BRAVE,DECEITFULandmany more examples in ethics, are said to be thick evaluative concepts (hereafter,thick concepts).1There are many, many examples of thick concepts beyond theethical realm. Artworks can be elegant and jejune, teachers can be wise and ignorant,children can be angelic and cheeky, adults can be childlike and childish, gardens canbe delicate and cluttered, academics can be modest and pompous, and so on, and soon, and so on.The supposed difference between thin and thick concepts is a phenomenon that isrelatively easy to spot: we are picking out evaluative concepts that are more or lessspecific. Matters become harder when we try to capture exactly what is going on.Here is a rough and ready distinction to get us started. Often the distinction is put sothat whereas thin concepts are primarily or wholly evaluative (in whatever sense isgiven to‘evaluative’), thick concepts mix evaluation, or evaluative conceptual con-tent, with something that might be called nonevaluative, descriptive conceptual content, or mix with it to a more significant degree than happens with thin concepts.In other words, the application of a thin concept is primarily or wholly concernedwith giving a sense of approval or disapproval. In contrast, a thick concept will dothatandgive a sense, or more of a sense, of what the thing is like that is socategorized, a sense beyond the fact that it is to be liked or disliked. Often commen-tators refer to‘normativity’—either in addition to evaluative content or as a substi-tute for it—and thus make reference to the fact that both thin and thick concepts canprovide guidance and reasons for action, even if only defeasibly. Within this frame-work, thin concepts’prime or whole function is typically thought to be to providesuch guidance and reasons, while thick concepts do this and additionally reflect theworld somehow. So, for example, we could say that it would be (prudentially) wrongto walk along the cliff edge, and we could also say that the edge is dangerous. The‘wrong’is simply an expression of a reason not to do something, while the‘danger-ous’will indicate such a reason and also indicate something about what the edge islike, such as the fact that it is crumbling, craggy, and high up.
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