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E-book Theoretical Knowledge in the Mohist Canon
Anyone undertaking a long-term historical study of any particular field of human activity is confronted with the difficulty that the contents and boundaries of that field are inevitably fluid and change over time. The historical study of science is no exception to this. Is it possible to conceptualize science broadly enough to include what has traditionally been considered science and at the same time narrowly enough to exclude practices and activities that we today deem unscientific? Earlier forms of science may include elements that are later recognized as not science at all. Astrology and alchemy, for example, still prominently figured in early modern sci-ence, but are now not generally regarded as science, but rather seen as pseudo- sciences. And different strands of traditional practices and thinking that may not have originally been deemed scientific sensu stricto may at some point merge with each other, taking on a new form that can then be considered properly scientific, e.g., the merger of practical mathematics with natural philosophy in early modern Europe, resulting in modern exact science. In the end any answer to the question of what historical human activity and knowledge are to be considered scientific depends on how science is defined, i.e., what characteristics of science are deemed essential.1 If the discovery and systematic, often quantitative, treatment of regularities in nature is deemed to be that criterion, science begins in such early civi-lizations as in the Near East, Asia, and Mesoamerica. If systematic argumentation about such regularities and theoretical proofs are deemed to be that criterion, ancient Greece is most prominently considered the historical place where science emerged. If the empirical foundation of knowledge by systematic experimentation is consid-ered the vital criterion, then science only begins in early modern times.A pragmatic approach to delineating the field of a science for historical study would be to follow the connected currents of traditions that have led to its modern manifestation and consider everything that contributed to these currents to be of relevance to the history of that science. But when a historical tradition, however significant at a certain time in a certain context, did not become a part of a develop-mental trajectory that led to some aspect of modern science we are denied this pragmatic approach. In particular when we discuss the emergence of a specific type of science in ancient China and compare it to the independent emergence of such a type of science in ancient Greece, as we will endeavor to do here, we have to recog-nize this difficulty and to be conscious of what exactly to compare. In defining this type of science we have to be careful to distinguish what constitutes in its historical manifestations a necessary feature, i.e., what truly motivates us to identify the his-torical activity as science, and what are contingencies of the specific historical man-ifestations. Failing to make such a distinction either renders the comparison impossible, because no two cultural activities that have developed independently will ever be identical; or it may lead to privileging the manifestation in one culture over that in the other, the first being taken as a standard, and the second subordi-nated to it, analyzed and judged by how it matches the features of that first standard. Earlier analyses of ancient Chinese science and in particular of the Mohist Canon—the text whose analysis and interpretation lies at the center of this book—show that scholars have not infrequently fallen into this trap and have tended to this kind of biased judgment, consciously or unconsciously taking western science as the default standard and subordinating judgments about Chinese science to that.
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