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E-book Vote Buying in Indonesia : The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery
Indonesia is no exception. Soon after Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime came to an end in 1998, Indonesia’s party system entered a new, post-authoritarian era. Political parties, of which there were previ-ously only three because of heavy government regulations, could now form freely. Consequently, a highly competitive multiparty system emerged, which coincided with the simultaneous introduction of multi-level elections from legislative to direct presidential ballots. In the wake of this unprecedented development, almost all political parties were neo-phytes with no political credibility (Vlaicu, 2016). Ideological divisions among political parties were also not salient. Thus, voters were often unable to differentiate political parties regarding policy positions or plat-forms. Meanwhile, post-Suharto’s electoral system that generated ‘candidate-centred’ elections (voters can choose candidates over parties) failed to mitigate such problems. Under these circumstances, candidates were forced to generate a personal vote and candidate-centred campaigns rather than building a party vote and party-centred campaigns. Thus, in order to stand out from competitors within their own parties, candidates were unhesitating to buy votes, as happened in numerous transitions dur-ing the third and fourth waves of democratisation.It is increasingly clear that an unprecedented wave of institutional changes in Indonesia since 1998 has created more room for clientelistic strategies. The changes in political and electoral systems, even with the best of long-term goals to create free and fair elections as well as appropriate channels of accountability (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012: 1), crystallise one of basic questions guiding this book: what effects have political and institutional factors had on the nature of patronage politics in Indonesia? How well do institutional arrangements explain the scope, patterns, determinants, targeting mecha-nisms, and effectiveness of vote buying as a form of patronage distribu-tion? This book aims to answer these questions posed by the connection shared between these twin issues of change: the changes in the political institutions after the authoritarian regime, especially in the electoral arena, and the changes in the nature and mechanics of vote buying.However, given the burgeoning of scholarly writings on the impact of electoral systems on clientelism, the analytical focus of this book is on vote buying by arguing that particular contextual factors—especially the adop-tion of open-list proportional voting system as a result of the electoral reforms after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian rule—matter greatly in explaining the ubiquity of vote buying in Indonesia. This book presents—in much more length—a wide-ranging study of the dynamics of vote buy-ing in Indonesia’s young democracy, exploring the nature, extent, determinants, targeting, and effectiveness of this practice. Despite vote buying becoming central feature to electoral campaigns in Southeast Asian countries, particularly in Indonesia, where this practice has gained promi-nence in its post-Suharto’s electoral politics, most influential studies on clientelism have emerged from other world regions. This book therefore aims to fill the gap in the scholarship reference on electoral clientelism in Indonesia and to situate my findings about the country within the context of wider academic literature on the field.
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