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E-book Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics

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Penilaian

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The project I have undertaken is to account for ethical perception (aisth?sis) in Aristotle’s ethics—to give perception a place of importance in ethi-cal reasoning, choice, and action—and to offer an account of the faculty of perception that is expansive enough to include reception of the ethical significance of particulars. This project is motivated philosophically both by particular features of Aristotle’s thought and more generally by an increas-ing philosophical awareness that the ethical agent is an embodied, situated individual, rather than primarily a disembodied, abstract rational will. Tra-ditionally, the human soul (psuch?) or human nature has been understood to have a nonrational part characterized by desires and perceptions and a rational part characterized by thinking, knowledge, and argument (Nic. Eth. 1102a26–28). Depending on how the relationship between these two sides is conceived, the nonrational side is either a bane to be controlled (or ignored) by the rational side, or it plays an irreducible role in contributing to moral choice and action. By establishing and accounting for perception’s place in ethics, I seek to show the importance for ethical life of integrating both ele-ments of human nature, the rational and nonrational, the human and the animal. Aristotle is famous for offering what might be called a situational ethics: dis-cerning what one ought to do is not derivable from universal laws, but must be assessed with respect to the very particulars that make up the situation in which one must act. Famously, Aristotle argues that what virtue calls for is acting and feeling in an appropriate manner; that is, at the right time, to the right degree, in the right manner, with respect to the right people, and so on (Nic. Eth. 1106b21–24). Moreover, because of the situational specificity of right action, one must also have the right character in order to discern what virtue calls for—only the virtuous person sees what is truly good. If one has a faulty character, the particulars will appear in a distorted manner, just as the wine tastes bitter to those who are ill (1113a25–29).It appears that a consequence of the situational specificity of virtuous action is that in order to be virtuous one must see rightly, in a literal sense. Aristotle is consistent in designating perception (aisth?sis) as the faculty that apprehends the particular (De anima 417b21–29;Nic. Eth. 1109b23, 1113a1–2, 1126b4, 1142a27, 1143b6, 1147a27, 1147b18). Moreover, if those who are not virtuous cannot discern instances of virtuous action as virtuous (as a person who is ill cannot taste wine as sweet), this means that there is a limit to what the powers of intellect can accomplish with regard to virtuous action, for if virtue were simply a matter of understanding, whether one does or does not have the right character should not matter. Discerning virtuous action, then, seems to be a matter of perception.

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Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

185 RAB p

Penerbit

USA : Northwestern University Press., 2018

Deskripsi Fisik

207 hlm

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

9780810136434

Klasifikasi

185

Tipe Isi

text

Tipe Media

computer

Tipe Pembawa

online resource

Edisi

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Subjek

Aristotelian Philosophy

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

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Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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