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E-book The Problem of Evil for Atheists
The eighteenth-century philosopher George Berkeley faced criticisms fromcontemporaries who argued that his metaphysical system, that is, idealism,lacked a compelling solution to the problem of evil. In response, Berkeleydid not propose a solution to the problem of evil. Instead, he pointed outthat his system was not unique in failing to solve the problem; everyalternative system had also encountered the same difficulty. He thereforeremarked,‘The problem of evil is everyone’s problem, and everyone’sproblem is no one’s problem!’I heard this anecdote from Daniel Stoljar,who heard it from David Armstrong in his undergraduate philosophy classat the University of Sydney in the 1980s. The anecdote is most likely basedon Armstrong’s heavily paraphrased version of Berkeley’s view about philo-sophical disagreement.¹ Yet, this anecdote is my inspiration for writing thepresent book.The problem of evil poses a challenge for traditional theists by asking howthey could rationally believe in the existence of an omnipotent and whollygood God given that the world isfilled with evil manifested in such events aswars, crimes, and natural disasters. This is widely considered one of the mostsignificant challenges to belief in God and has evoked many responses fromtraditional theists. However, it is not my aim in this book to propose another response to the problem or to evaluate the effectiveness of existing responsesat length. I deliberately refrain from such endeavours. Instead, I take a stepback from the ongoing debate surrounding the problem and adopt a uniqueperspective which transcends the familiar perennial debate between trad-itional theists and atheists.When Berkeley claimed that the problem of evil was a problem not onlyfor his view but also for its alternatives, he probably had in mind other earlymodern metaphysical systems that are also based on the traditional theisticworldview. Hence, what Berkeley meant was that the problem of evil is aproblem for all types of traditional theists, not just traditional theists whosubscribe to idealism, and, hence, it is not a problem unique to those in theidealist camp. My central thesis in this book is much more radical thanBerkeley’s: the problem of evil is a problem the scope of which rangesbeyondtraditional theism; the problem arises not only for traditional theists but alsofor most people, including those who reject traditional theism. I have chosenThe Problem of Evil for Atheistsfor the title of the present book to under-score the most radical assertion I put forth—namely, that the problem of evilconstitutes a substantial obstacle even for atheists. As I elaborate extensivelyin my discourse, however, my reasoning extends to various categories of‘non-theists’, encompassing not only atheists but also pantheists, axiarchists,and even adherents of Eastern religious and cultural traditions.
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