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E-book Adapting for Inertia : Delivering Large Government ICT Projects in Australia and New Zealand
At the heart of my findings is a conclusion that, notwithstanding the work undertaken to-date, the current model of weak governance of ICT at a whole-of-government level ... leads to sub-optimal outcomes. (Gershon 2008: iii)1[Earlier reports] identified significant shortcomings in the public sector’s management of such [ICT] projects and included numerous recommendations. Despite this, there has been little sign of lessons learnt and ICT projects such as myki, HealthSMART and LEAP, were regularly in the newspapers for the wrong reasons. (Victorian Ombudsman 2012: 1)2The [negative] impacts of the well-publicised Novopay3 failures have reverberated across New Zealand. Every state and state-integrated school in the country has been affected ... [I]t is clear to us that important lessons from the past ... should have been learned but were not. (Jack & Wevers 2013: 1)Rarely has the need for change been demonstrated more clearly than through the failure of the Asset Management System project. To spend around $70 million dollars only to make the system worse is clearly unacceptable ... [and] further demonstrates that action to mprove the management of ICT projects is required to not only get better levels of service provision but also to avoid crippling waste. (Public Accounts Committee 2014: 5)4The above quotes are from reports into the poor outcomes of large information and communications technology (ICT) software projects in the Australian and New Zealand public sectors. They either reference or allude to a failure in institutional governance and a failure to adapt that governance based on past learnings.They resonated with me due to my professional life as a long-term NSW Government employee. For the past 20-plus years, I managed various government ICT software and infrastructure projects and programs. My final responsibility was managing components of the Learning Management and Business Reform (LMBR) program within the NSW Department of Education (NSW DoE). The LMBR was an exceptionally large program of work, attempting multiple organisational transformations: a new financial system; a new student administration, learning, and management system; and a new human resources/payroll system. For an organisation the size of the NSW DoE, any one of these was a huge undertaking and to attempt all of them together under the umbrella of one program was delusional.
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