Text
E-book Aristotle and the Ontology of St. Bonaventure
The claim “what we know is what exists” appears, at first glance, to be quite an obvious statement – we know dogs and horses and so it seems obvious that dogs and horses exist. However, upon further reflection, it rather seems that what is most properly the object of our knowledge is not these particular dogs and horses themselves, but something that is universal – what Plato called a “form,” i.e. what is expressed by the definitions of these sensible things, as opposed to the sensible things themselves. If I want to know what “Rye the horse” is, I need more primarily to know what “horse” is and what it means – a definition that is universally ap-plicable to any horse, not only to Rye. However, these universals which are more properly the objects of our knowledge are nowhere to be found among particular things. Thus, if we want still to maintain that what we know (i.e. universal forms) is what exists, we must ask: What and where these forms are, if they are not counted among sensible things?First of all, let us take a step back and look more closely at the problems that arise from the claim that these objects of knowledge (i.e. the forms) exist – most of which arise from the consideration of the relationship between the universal form and the sensible things of which we predicate the form as a definition, i.e. the problem of participation. If we look, first of all, to the relationship between one form and a plurality of sensible particulars, we come upon the issues which Plato originally found with his own theory of forms in the Parmenides – i.e. the third man and the sail problems. If a thinker, moreover, is working within a context where philosophy needs to be made compatible with Christian beliefs, we have another set of problems. Where do we locate the forms if not in the Neoplatonic hypostasis of the Intellect? How do we avoid mediation between God and the created order?In the Middle Ages the difficult task of confronting the many questions concern-ing universals, our cognition of them, and their ontological status was approached head-on. It seems quite fair to say that the importance of these questions concern-ing universals was caused, at least in part, by the rediscovery of the texts of Aristotle – a thinker for whom this topic is indeed central. Accordingly, we find Aristotle’s thought, or some interpretation of Aristotle, at the basis of many of the key figures in the history of what has become known as the “problem of universals” in the Middle Ages – Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and even William of Ockham. Of course, this is not only true of the Western tradition, but also of thinkers of the Islamic world, such as Averroes and Avicenna, whose influence is felt in the West perhaps almost as much as that of Aristotle himself. Indeed, to a great extent, all of these figures who develop unique and innovative views of universal forms can be characterized in one respect or another as engaging deeply with the works of Aristotle.
Tidak tersedia versi lain