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E-book Controversy over the Existence of the World
Our next task is to carry out formal-ontological analyses on the one hand, and material-ontological1 ones on the other, that are connected to our main problem. We begin with the basic conviction that an entity of arbitrary form and material deter-mination cannot exist in an altogether arbitrary manner, but rather that necessary interconnections yet to be discovered obtain between an existent’s mode of being, form, and matter – especially when it comes to the mode of existence of a world; the latter need not necessarily be identical with the mode of being of the individual objects belonging to it, something which until now has been hardly noticed. Our guiding idea here is that differences in form that may eventually be disclosed will lead to differences in mode of being.Thus far we have been satisfied with a crude separation of formal and mate-rial ontology. Husserl’s concept of form has been canonical in phenomenological analyses, but it is not entirely without reproach. If, however, we turn to other authors for a relevant briefing, we encounter an almost unbelievable confusion in concept formation and an incessant commingling of various concepts of form. It is therefore first of all necessary to gain clarity on this point and to strive for an unequivocal characterization of the form-concept, from which an unambiguous determination of the antithesis between form and matter must emerge. This will also eliminate a palpable gap in our previous deliberations. It is not surprising that we do not have an exact definition [Definition]2 of form at our disposal, since it is doubtful that something like the “form” of something lends itself to being defined at all. Nor do we aspire to a definition of form. But that does not mean that we have to be reconciled to a situation in which the concepts of form and matter constantly fluctuate. Here we only undertake the attempt to sort out the various concepts of form that are ordinarily thrown together, and in this way to clarify and fix that concept of form which lies at the basis of modern formal-ontological investigations.?3To that end, we begin by contrasting various types of questions pertaining to form or matter. What is that: the form of something, and what is that: the matter of something?4 – these are the two correlative questions pertaining to essence5 [es-sentialen Fragen] that we contrast to the special analytic questions which we shall deal with after having answered the former. The issue in the analytic problems is what simpler moments [Momente]6 can be found in the form of something, and how they structure [aufbauen] this form. At issue here may be the form of some arbitrary something [eines beliebigen Etwas] taken in the broadest sense, or of something specified in a particular manner. In the latter case, it may be a question of, say, the form of a work of art in general, or more specifically, of some wholly determinate individual work of art. Or – in a different case – a question of the form of an indi-vidual existentially autonomous object as opposed to the form of a general idea, 7and the like. To both these types of8 questions we still need to contrast the questions pertaining to determination of form9, in which the aim of the inquiry is to determine what comprises the form of some object. We shall not deal here any further with these latter questions, and thus forego developing their more precise sense.
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