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E-book Floundering Stability : US Foreign Policy in Egypt
King George III of Great Britain and Ireland’s opening parliamentary address emphasized his personal connection to the country and commit-ment to the “excellent constitution” that laid out ties between the monar-chy and legislature.1 While the king and parliament held different ideas for governance, both seats of power agreed that Britain’s colonies should fall under parliamentary control. This position, along with a lack of repre-sentation in parliament and a series of laws constraining North American colonies—including the infamous 1773 Tea Act—provoked revolt, war, and the subsequent Declaration of Independence. The move freed the thirteen colonies from British control, established autonomy over their rights to liberty,2 and indicated an early commitment to the idea of stability. This commitment was then reflected in the Constitution of the United States of America’s pursuit of justice, tranquility, defense, welfare, and freedom.3From there, these stability underpinnings were extended to matters of for-eign policy and became inseparable from how the US perceives and seeks stability in international relations.US presidents and policymakers have since sought to influence and spread global stability using foreign economic policy measures. Nota-ble support for and practice of this endeavor was reflected in the two world war US presidents’ positions and policy choices. For President Woodrow Wilson, this came in the form of a post–World War I deci-sion to remove “all economic barriers” when dealing with foreign pow-ers to ensure world peace.4 Then, Franklin D. Roosevelt explained in a World War II speech to the US Congress how “economic safety for the America of the future is threatened unless a greater economic stability comes to the rest of the world.”5 Since then, the US has continued to practice and believe in this policy—in a nod to the post-British founda-tion of the country—and this is evidenced through government docu-ments, speeches, and foreign economic policy data. This particular US stability-through-economics formulated foreign policy is the focus ofthis book, referred to as the stability policy hereafter. This results in an in-depth examination and evaluation of the US stability policy in Egyptbetween 1981 and 2011. The findings inform my argument that the US failed to ensure stability in this Egyptian case study, despite a persistent pursuit of the stability policy. I evidence this by laying out the how and why the stability policy’s performance was more mixed than the dictates of the stability-through-economics idea.
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