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E-book The China Alternative : Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands

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Penilaian

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The Pacific Islands region has entered a new period of uncertainty precipitated in large part by the emergence of China as a major regional actor as well as the reaction of more established powers to perceived threats to their longstanding influence. In March 2019, in the wake of a flurry of activity on the part of Australia, New Zealand and the United States aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Pacific Islands, Deputy Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Cristelle Pratt declared that ‘great power competition is back!’ before suggesting that ‘Our task is to find an appropriate balance between leveraging the competition between partners and ensuring peace and cooperation prevails in our Blue Pacific’ (Pratt 2019, emphasis in original). We will argue here that although Island leaders have been remarkably successful at leveraging competition, this may not always be possible when great power strategic interests are at stake. Indeed, Pacific Island leaders may have no option but to take sides in the event that cooperation gives way to great power conflict somewhere in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean. In 2006 Beijing signalled heightened interest in the Pacific Islands with the first China–Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum held in Fiji. Since then, China has become firmly established as a major trade, aid, investment and diplomatic partner in the region, and Chinese companies are increasingly active in resource extraction, construction and commerce. Long-established external actors in the region first responded cautiously to China’s spectacular rise, perhaps because Beijing was at pains not to confront them directly in regional or global affairs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Hu Jintao, even backed away from the doctrine of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ (Zheng 2005) on the grounds that ‘rise’ sounded threatening (Glaser and Medeiros 2007). An analysis of China’s foreign policy community written at the beginning of President Xi Jinping’s rule concluded that it was not monolithic, running the full spectrum of nativists and realists at one end to selective multilateralists and globalists at the other (Shambaugh 2013:13–44). While realists were thought to hold the upper hand, the author held open the possibility of a shift in either direction.A number of recent developments mark the arrival of a new phase in the relationship, occasioned in the first instance by Xi Jinping’s more assertive posture on the world stage. Since assuming leadership in 2012, Xi has consolidated his hold on domestic power and articulated a series of highly ambitious initiatives, including the nationalistic ‘China Dream’ that imagines China ‘rejuvenated’ and restored to its proper place in the world, with the Belt and Road investment and infrastructure program forging trade corridors across vast swathes of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, Oceania and Europe (see, for example, Bradsher 2020). It is clear the nativists in China’s foreign policy community now hold sway. Xi’s global posture effectively marks the end of Deng Xiaoping’s influential foreign policy dictum of ‘hide and bide’, whereby China adopted low-profile diplomacy and put aside any aspirations towards world leadership.

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Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

320 AQO t

Penerbit

Australia : ANU Press., 2021

Deskripsi Fisik

520 hlm

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

9781760464172

Klasifikasi

320

Tipe Isi

text

Tipe Media

computer

Tipe Pembawa

online resource

Edisi

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Subjek

Political dan Government Science

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

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Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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