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E-book Emotion, Reason and Action in Kant

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Penilaian

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Th is is a book about practical reason, action, and emotion in Kant. My aim is to answer what is the real importance of emotion for Kant. I will try to show that Kant had considerable views about emotions and that he was not blind to their importance in action in general. My object is not moral action, but action in general, including weak and even evil ones. My purpose is to show that Kant dedicated a considerable part of his work to the study of the relation between reason and emotion. In Chapter 1, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and what can count as a reason for or cause of an action. First, I begin with the distinction between motiva and stimulus in the pre-critical lessons on ethics and metaphysics. In the Groundwork , Kant explains this distinction in terms of objective and subjective grounds for actions: the motive ( Bewegungsgrund ) is the objective ground of an action and the incentive ( Tr i ebfe d e r ) is the subjective one. Next, I analyze the possibility of the overdetermination of actions, understood as the possibility of two possible causes for the same action. I will argue that according to the incorporation thesis, there is only one motive for an action. Second, I try to reconcile the weakness of the will and the incorporation thesis. I will show that, according to the incorporation thesis, Kant is committed to a strong thesis concerning causation of actions. Reason and only reason can be the cause of an action. If we accept weakness, however, we must have a humbler solution to the Kantian theory of action: the domain of rational agency does not have the same extension of voluntary action. In the model of rational agency there is no room for weakness, although it is a fact in real actions. Th e domain of the voluntary is, then, wider than the domain of rational agency. Th e weakness of the will applies to the fi rst and the incorporation thesis applies only to the second. In Chapter 2, I shall analyze whether human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer in the Critique of Pure Reason , the Groundwork , and the Critical of Practical Reasonis undoubtedly yes, but that Kant is ambiguous in Th e Metaphysics of Moralsand also in the Anthropology . In the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions for the reception of the concept of duty: moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for one self (self-esteem). I examine moral feeling and the love of human beings, trying to fi gure out whether or not they are necessary sensible preconditions for moral actions.

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Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

142 BOR e

Penerbit

London : Bloomsbury Academic., 2019

Deskripsi Fisik

221 hlm

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

9781350078376

Klasifikasi

142

Tipe Isi

text

Tipe Media

computer

Tipe Pembawa

online resource

Edisi

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Subjek

Critical Philosophy

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

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Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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